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Abstract 
 
In this article I ask the question, how should we conceive good practice in caring professions 
such as child, youth, family, disability and aged-care work? I make a case for a 
conceptualization of good practice in human services that draws on Aristotle’s account of the 
intellectual virtues. This way of understanding practice has seen a recent revival as part of a 
movement commonly referred to as neo-Aristotelianism. According to the neo-Aristotelian 
point of view there are different types of material that correspond to particular forms of 
activity, ways of knowing, kinds of agents, and sorts of ends. Subsequently a practice has 
integrity and can be conceived good when these different aspects are in harmony. I apply this 
framework to practices of care. I argue the matter of caring work is best dealt with by a form 
of action described as praxis, and praxis is best guided by phronesis or practical wisdom. I 
add that praxis and phronesis are most suited to be performed and exercised by the phronimos 
with the purpose of achieving good conduct and the good life for all involved. I recommend 
nurturing and enabling praxis and phronesis to achieve good practice in the people 
professions. 
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Introduction 
 
Currently I am employed as a lecturer in a human service program at a large Australian 
university. Part of my role is teaching. Before taking up this position I had a number of youth, 
disability, and family work jobs over many years. Whilst doing direct service delivery I was 
constantly trying to do the right thing, which was often a struggle in light of the complex and 
perplexing nature of the work. I find I am in the similar situation now when it comes to 
teaching. 
 
To help work out the best thing to do I searched for answers. What I typically found were 
theories to be applied, instruments to be used, and instructions to be followed. In other words, 
doing caring work and teaching well generally meant learning about and correctly 
implementing other people’s explanations and courses of action. However I came to 
appreciate that while empirically tested methods, expert prescriptions, and technically derived 
solutions provided some useful ideas they were never enough to achieve good practice. 
I realised something else was required to practice well. Yet this ‘thing’ I intuitively knew I 
needed to do good practice always seemed to escape words. The fact that it was not 
something talked about in the education and practice realms I was involved with did not help. 
I could never quite articulate what this critical aspect of good human service practice was, 
until recently. 
 
Fortunately I have been introduced to this factor and it is termed phronesis or practical 
wisdom. In this article I describe the value of phronesis to understanding good practice in 
‘practices of care’ (Polkinghorne 2004). 
 
There are good reasons to examine how we should conceive good practice in ‘people 
professions’ such as child, youth, family, disability and aged-care work (Bondi, Carr, Clark 
and Clegg 2011). First and most obvious it is difficult to achieve good practice if we do not 
know what good practice is. Green (2009, p. 1) was right to argue professional practice, ‘…is 
still in need of clarification and elaboration, as is indeed the concept of practice itself’.  
At the moment there is not a clear defensible conception of good practice in human services. 
More to the point most accounts fail to make a case for the types of reasoning and action that 
are most suited to the matter that caring work deals with (Dunne 2005). As a consequence 
conceptions of ‘good practice’ in person-to-person work too often privilege scientific and 
instrumental rationality (Ord 2014, Schon 1991). Ellul (1964) and Habermas (1974) argued 
technical ways of knowing have assimilated scientific and practical forms of reasoning and 
come dominate all fields of human activity. The ubiquity of technique is evident in popular 
approaches to human service delivery such as evidence-based practice, professional practice 
standards, codes of ethics, ‘what works’ guides, and transferable skills handbooks. However, 
as I shall argue, the integrity of human practices requires a way of knowing that is different to 
formal logic, the faithful application of scientifically produced ‘truths’, or a blind compliance 
with authority. 
 
Second, increasing numbers of Australians are involved in the administration, delivery and 
use of human services (Australian Government Department of Employment 2014). It is 
reasonable to assume that people who are involved in such work, whether they are service 
users, students, practitioners, managers, researchers, funders, or policy makers want such 
practice to be good. Figuring out how to best understand and achieve good practice in human 
services also matters because this is what people deserve (Dworkin 2011). In other words 
there are ethical and moral dimension to articulating a good conceptualization of child, youth, 
family, disability and aged-care work, and delivering good practice in these fields is the just, 
right and good thing to do. Finally, supporting good practice in caring work could also go a 
long way towards preventing bad practice. Unfortunately the literature is replete with 
examples of bad practice in human services (Bessant, Hil and Watts 2005, Gambrill 2013). 
Accounts of harmful interventions illustrate the need to figure out a defensible 
conceptualization of good practice in the ‘social professions’ (Clifford 2014). 
 
Aristotle (2009) was the first to distinguish phronesis, and his account is upheld by those who 
are typically referred to as neo-Aristotelians. Therefore to define phronesis I examine how it 
was understood by Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians. I begin by describing Aristotle’s main 
intellectual virtues or types of reasoning, and phronesis is one of these. Second, I use 
Aristotle’s characterisation of different forms of rationality to make a case for how we can 
best conceive good practices of care. Finally I discuss implications of this conception of good 
practice for how good human service work can be achieved. 
 
 
Aristotle’s intellectual virtues and plural forms of rationality 
 
According to Aristotle’s (2009) account of the intellectual virtues there are plural forms of 
rationality, and these varied ways of reasoning suit different types of materials, activities, 
agents, and outcomes. Dunne (2005, p. 381) recaptured Aristotle’s point when he argued the 
integrity, strength and success of practices requires being clear about,  
‘…just what kind of material we deal with in practical domains: the material will 
determine the kind of activity we are engaged in and, in turn, the kind of knowledge 
that is required or the type of rationality that is appropriate.’ 
The idea that there are diverse ways of knowing that correspond to different forms of matter, 
action and ends is quite radical for our time. This is because we live in a world where a 
particular type of knowledge has been dominant for several centuries and this is variously 
described as technical, instrumental, modernist, empirical, positivist or scientific (Carr 2004, 
Eisner 2002, Flyvbjerg 2001, Habermas 1974, Kinsella and Pitman 2012, Schon 1991). More 
to the point, it is generally presumed and taken-for-granted there is only one useful and 
legitimate condition of knowledge or only one type of rationality, and this way of knowing is 
subsequently used to guide all action regardless of whether it takes place in the physical, 
organic, human or social realm (Polkinghorne 2004). What I am proposing here, and what 
Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians argue, is that there are different and likewise valuable 
forms of rationality. 
 
Table 1 explains Aristotle’s (2009) ideas and demonstrate the correspondence between 
particular types of matter, forms of action, ways of knowing, kinds of agents, and sorts of 
ends. 
 
First, Aristotle (2009) argued there are ‘things eternal’. Dunne (1997, p. 238) suggested such 
‘things’ include ‘mathematical entities, the heavenly bodies, and the divine being or first 
mover’. Gravity is an example of such material. The form of activity most suitable for 
dealing with such matter is developing theoretical knowledge or what the Ancient Greeks 
phrased ‘theoria’. And this action is best guided by episteme, or scientific reasoning. This is 
the knowing and doing required of mathematicians, scientists and others who work in the 
hard sciences and who deal with the matter just described. 
 
Second, there are materials that Dunne (2005, p. 379) described as ‘stable or passive’ such as 
‘wood, stone, cloth, or leather’. On this occasion the activity best suited to deal with this 
matter is producing, making or ‘poiesis’. Techne or technical rationality, often referred to as 
‘know-how’, is the appropriate reasoning in this instance. Engineers and other workers in 
construction, architects and artists are examples of the people who deal with such matter and 
therefore need to be good at exercising techne and performing poiesis. 
 
Third, we have the realm of human action and interaction with all of its intricacy, fragility, 
passions, contradictions, motivations, and unpredictability (Dunne 2005). According to 
Aristotle (2009) and the neo-Aristotelians the most suitable form of action to deal with this 
sort of material is praxis. Phronesis, or practical rationality, is the type of reasoning that 
corresponds to praxis. In other words, anyone who deals with people needs to possess 
phronesis and perform praxis to do it well. 
 Using this account of different types of rationality suiting different forms of action to deal 
with particular sorts of matter how should we understand or conceive of good practice in 
human services? 
 
 
A conception of good practice in child, youth and family work 
 
Child, youth, family, disability and aged-care work are examples of ‘human practices’ that 
deal with ‘the frailty and intricacy of human affairs’ (Dunne 2005, p. 381). To put this 
another way, the matter of human service work is complex and perplexing human beings, and 
contingent, unpredictable and situated human relations. Schon (1991, pp. ix, 16) elaborates 
on this description by arguing such professional practices are characterised by ‘unique, 
uncertain and conflicted situations’, or, borrowing from Ackoff (1979), ‘messes’. This 
understanding of the material that social professions work with resonates with accounts of 
practice in social work and youth work (Fook, Ryan and Hawkins 2000, Spence, Devanney 
and Noonan 2006). More importantly, it guides how we should conceive good practice in 
these field. 
 
According to Aristotle (2009) and those who agree with his account, episteme and theoria are 
inadequate when dealing with human action and interaction. This is because, for example, 
they ignore context, uncertainty, unpredictability, and the need for situational awareness to 
make good decisions in the human realm. The fact that people are not eternal beings also 
makes episteme and theoria unsuitable. Hamilton (2005) and Schon (1991) similarly 
questioned the conventional idea that good practice in caring work can be understood 
scientifically. In other words cumulative, explanatory, universal, and predictive theories will 
not achieve good practice in human service work because the matter which this type of work 
deals with is conditional, inexact, irregular and immeasurable (Flyvbjerg 2001). Good 
practice in the caring professions should not be conceived of as a type of theoria or science 
guided by episteme or formal logic. 
 
Aristotle (2009) and the neo-Aristotelians similarly argued techne and poiesis are insufficient 
forms of reasoning and action when dealing with the complexity of people (Polkinghorne 
2004). This is because, for example, people are not stable or passive objects to be fashioned 
or crafted into ‘things’, which in the current neo-liberal policy context typically translates 
into things that serve the interests of free-market capitalism. Thinking about people in such 
ways, as clumps of physical matter rather than unique and complex human beings, is also 
dehumanizing and deeply troubling (Arendt 1963). Moreover ‘know-how’, or the efficient 
application of rules or techniques to produce pre-determined goals or results, is inadequate to 
achieve good practice in human services (Bondi, Carr, Clark and Clegg 2011). Dunne’s 
(1993) critique of technical rationality challenges approaches to achieving good human 
service practice that privilege means-ends efficiency. Such methods aim to tightly control 
what people do often for the purpose of maximising utility and include the use of 
technologies such as outcomes based funding, accountability regimes, and evidence-based 
and competency-based approaches to practice. However these mechanisms wrongly assume 
people are controllable and worryingly presume people should be controlled. Good practice 
in practices of care should not be understood as a form of poiesis or craft guided by techne or 
the efficient use of knowledge or demonstration of skill. 
 
Using Aristotle’s (2009) and the neo-Aristotelian account of different sorts of rationality, 
good practice in the human services should be conceived as a form of praxis guided by 
phronesis. This is because practitioners of care work with the sort of matter that is best dealt 
with by such reasoning and action. Polkinghorne (2004, p. 126) agrees. 
‘…phronesis is the proper rationality for developing knowledge to determine actions 
(praxis) that deal with people’ (original italics). 
Moreover praxis and phronesis correspond to the contingent, unpredictable and situated 
nature of human service work and work involving complex and perplexing human beings. 
 
According to Polkinghorne (2004) praxis can be understood as good conduct, doing the good 
and acting for the good of the other. Similarly Green (2009, p 11) argued praxis indicates 
‘…engaged work in and on the world’ (original italics). And ‘engaged’ people are doing 
praxis by clearly thinking about what they are doing and why they are doing it. Such accounts 
of praxis make it clear why it is the form of action, compared to theoria and poiesis, most 
suited to a defensible conception of good practice in the people professions. Moreover to 
have integrity in what they do, people working with people should have a foremost interest to 
do good for the people they are working with and act in ways that align with this. 
 
Phronesis is an ancient Greek term for which there is no direct modern translation. But 
phronesis is described variously as good judgment, practical wisdom, prudence, practical 
reasoning, and practical rationality. For example, Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, p. 5) 
characterised practical wisdom as the capacity to figure out, ‘…the right way to do the right 
thing in a particular circumstance, with a particular person, at a particular time’. Simply put 
phronesis is the capacity to figure out the right thing to do for the right reasons in each 
instance of practice. The fact human service work is never the same thing twice requires 
workers to exercise phronesis, rather than episteme or techne, to do good practice. And, just 
as important, the integrity of people professions demands the recognition of phronesis as 
critical to good practice. 
 
 
Supporting phronesis and praxis to achieve good human service practice 
 
When it comes to practices that involve work between people, such as child, youth, family, 
disability and aged-care work, the type of reasoning that is best suited to practicing well is 
not scientific or technical, it is practical. Now I am not suggesting that a good foundation of 
relevant knowledge and a broad repertoire of potentially useful skills are unimportant for 
practicing well. On the contrary such facts and techniques are necessary. However they are 
not enough. Much more is involved in doing good caring work than using scientifically 
produced evidence of what works or implementing standardised procedures. Carr (2014) 
illustrated the limits of episteme and techne in ‘professional services’ that include human 
services. 
‘…doctors do not just need medical knowledge or surgical skill, but the wisdom to 
employ these in the best interests of patients’ health; lawyers need not just legal 
knowledge, but the judgement to ensure that such knowledge conduces to the benefit 
of clients; teachers need not just the academic knowledge and pedagogical skills 
required for effective practice, but some understanding of how, when and where to 
use such knowledge and skills to the ultimate educational welfare of each and every 
pupil in their care’ (Carr 2014, p. 21). 
To explain my point another way, good practice in person-to-person work will not be 
achieved with the entrenched condition of knowledge I outlined earlier. Instead, achieving 
good practices of care requires a different way of knowing, and this way of knowing is 
phronesis. This conception of good practice in the people professions has a number of 
implications. 
 
First, it demonstrates that simply being compliant, obeying rules, following instructions, 
applying theory, or using instruments or techniques will not achieve good practice the caring 
fields. In other words, the current demands for deference to authority and obedience to 
regulation are inappropriate ways to realize good human practices. Moreover if practices of 
care deal with matter that is best understood as the messy, uncertain, volatile, and intricate 
world of human affairs, then it is indefensible to argue for an analytical or instrumental 
rationality to deal with this matter. Unfortunately the management, funding, administration 
and delivery of much human service work is based on a conception of practice that values the 
application of theory, means-end efficiency, and the pursuit of pre-determined context-
independent outcomes. Episteme and techne are the rationalities at play in the current trend 
towards evidence-based practice and the emphasis being put on the achievement of 
“outcomes” in state funded caring work. Such institutional arrangements dishonour the 
integrity of practices of care. A conception of good practice in the human services as a type 
of praxis to be guided by phronesis offers a counter to this current context. 
 
Second, this understanding of good practices of care suggests workers doing caring work 
need to act, and be equipped and enabled to act, in ways that align with thinking about the 
right thing to do in each instance of practice. In other words if we value good human service 
practice then we need to get serious about nurturing and supporting phronesis and praxis. 
Many neo-Aristotelians and proponents of phronesis and praxis would agree with me and 
have made suggestions on how we can do just that (Bessant 2009, Higgs et al 2012, Kinsella 
and Pitman 2012, Walker and Walker 2012). Many of these proposals focus on curriculum 
changes in higher education and include valuing the role of on-the-job placements to provide 
the kind of experience critical for the development of phronesis (Flyvbjerg 2001). But if we 
are really serious about empowering phronesis in the people professions then it is time to re-
think the organisational contexts in which such practices take place. The current utilitarian 
and neo-liberal oriented policy context is hostile to phronesis and praxis and places 
considerable constraints on individual efforts to achieve good practice in ways that align with 
the conceptualization described herein. More to the point phronesis and praxis call for new 
ways of collectively thinking about, valuing and investing in our human services. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of this article I described the dilemmas I faced working out how to achieve 
good practice when working with people. I imagine these challenges resonate with other 
practitioners in practices of care who continually face the challenge of figuring out what they 
should do and how to act well. I argued that doing good human service work requires more 
than explanatory and predictive knowledge or detailed information on the most efficient way 
to act. I made a case for a conceptualization of good practice in the caring professions that 
draws on Aristotle’s account of the intellectual virtues. According to this perspective a 
practice has integrity when there is a consistent and coherent unity between its material, 
activity, reasoning, agent and ends. I argued the matter of human service work is best dealt 
with by practitioners doing a form of action described as praxis, and praxis is best guided by 
phronesis or practical wisdom. I recommended nurturing and enabling praxis and phronesis 
to assist workers in the social professions with figuring out the right thing to do in each 
situation of practice. Ways the caring professions have been defined and debated and how 
these compare to the conceptualization presented herein are worthy of further investigation. 
There is also a need for further research on how phronesis and praxis can be institutionally 
supported, in particular in government policy, the organisational and funding arrangements of 
human services, and the education and training of practitioners. 
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Table 1: Aristotle’s intellectual virtues and their corresponding forms of action, agents, and 
outcomes (Adapted from: (a) Aristotle 2009; (b) Dunne 2005 pp. 378-380; (c) Dunne 1997 
pp. 237-249; (d) Flyvbjerg 2001 p. 57; (e) Polkinghorne 2004 p. 114). 
 
Material, 
matter being 
dealt with 
Activity, form 
of action: 
Reasoning to 
guide activity, 
intellectual 
virtue, way of 
knowing: 
Exercised, 
practiced, 
performed or 
possessed by: 
Outcomes, 
ends: 
Things eternal, 
the ‘universal, 
invariable, 
context 
independent’ 
(d), eg., 
‘mathematical 
entities, the 
heavenly 
bodies, and the 
divine…first 
mover’(c) 
Theoria – 
developing 
theoretical 
knowledge, 
theorizing, 
contemplation 
(science) 
Episteme – 
theoretical 
reasoning, 
scientific or 
analytical 
rationality, 
theoretical 
Sophoi – one 
devoted to theory 
and 
contemplating on 
things eternal 
‘Knowledge 
about the realm 
of the 
unchanging’ 
(e), Theoretical 
knowledge, 
Explanations 
and predictions, 
Eternal truths 
‘Wood, stone, 
cloth, or leather’ 
(b), other such 
stable or passive 
materials where 
‘…an already 
designed form 
can be imposed 
(b), ‘the fabric 
of the material 
universe, in its 
physical, 
chemical 
and…biological 
aspects’ (b) 
Poiesis – 
producing, 
making, 
application of 
technical 
knowledge and 
skill 
(a trade) 
Techne – 
planning, 
knowing how to 
make something, 
instrumental or 
technical 
rationality, 
productive 
Technitai – one 
who practices 
techne or skill 
Artifacts, Art, 
Craft, Products, 
Reproduction, 
‘…a 
substantial, 
durable product 
which – like the 
materials 
themselves – is 
quite separate 
from the 
producer and 
even from the 
activity of 
production’ (b) 
‘Volatile 
constellations of 
human passions 
and 
motivations’ 
(b), shifting and 
protean sites of 
engagement (b), 
‘a field of 
forces’ (b), 
human action 
and interaction 
(b), human 
practices (b) 
Praxis – 
acting, doing 
the good, 
practical 
understanding 
(conduct) 
Phronesis – 
deliberating on 
activities for the 
good, practical or 
value rationality, 
practical, 
practical wisdom 
(a) 
Phronimos – one 
who sees and is 
disposed to do the 
good in every 
situation 
Good conduct, 
Good action, 
Living well, 
Living fully, 
Doing the right 
thing for the 
right reason in 
each particular 
situation, ‘…a 
propitious [or 
favourable] 
result’ (b) 
